University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Robins Case Network

Robins School of Business

2-2020

Uber
Jeffrey S. Harrison
University of Richmond, harrison@richmond.edu

Bryant Holden
Kelli McKenna
Scott McQuiddy
Alex Wiles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/robins-case-network
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Strategic
Management Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Harrison, Jeffrey S., Bryant Holden, Kelli McKenna, Scott McQuiddy, and Alex Wiles. Uber. Case Study.
University of Richmond: Robins School of Business, 2020.

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Robins School of Business at UR Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Robins Case Network by an authorized administrator of UR
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Uber

February 2020

Written by Jeffrey S. Harrison, Bryant Holden, Kelli McKenna, Scott McQuiddy, and Alex Wiles at
the Robins School of Business, University of Richmond. Copyright © Jeffrey S. Harrison. This case
was written for the purpose of classroom discussion. It is not to be duplicated or cited in any form
without the copyright holder’s express permission. For permission to reproduce or cite this case,
contact Jeff Harrison at RCNcases@richmond.edu. In your message, state your name, affiliation
and the intended use of the case. Permission for classroom use will be granted free of charge.
Other cases are available at: http://robins.richmond.edu/centers/case-network.html.

In 2015 an article in the Wall Street Journal declared: “There’s an Uber for everything now.”1
The article was referring to the profusion of on-demand services available to consumers. Since
then the company continued to expand into new business areas. As of 2020, the company was
engaged in ride-hailing, food delivery, freight, and micromobility, offering rides to users through
dockless e-bikes and e-scooters.2 As CEO Dara Khosrowshahi said in an open letter published on
Uber’s website in April 2019, the company was “still barely scratching the surface when it
comes to huge industries like food and logistics, and how the future of urban mobility will
reshape cities for the better.”3
Dara left Expedia in 2017 to become Uber’s CEO in the wake of substantial internal conflict that
erupted under Uber founder and CEO Travis Kalanick. There was much still to do to rehabilitate
a corporate culture in light of accusations of discrimination and sexual harassment. There were
also some serious issues to settle with respect to the status of Uber drivers as employees or
private contractors, not to mention the troubling performance of the company’s stock after its
IPO in May 2019. How could Dara ensure Uber’s movement toward profitability, revitalize the
company’s culture, and rebuild its public image?
UNDERSTANDING UBER
Uber “sets the world in motion” through connecting individuals by way of its app-based
platform, which is operational in over 63 countries and 700 cities globally.4 Uber, rooted in
connectivity, operates through relationships with customers and drivers. Customers, or riders,
utilize the Uber app to hail rides, request food delivery, freight ship items, and reserve personal
mobility devices. Drivers utilize the app as independent contractors, using their own personal
vehicles to taxi customers or deliver food on behalf of participating restaurants.
Uber Culture
In November 2017, just months after Dara Khosrowshahi became Uber’s CEO, a document
outlining was released that explained Uber’s culture. It explained: “These norms preserve the
best of the founding Uber culture that built one of the world’s most valuable and important
companies, while recognizing that we must adapt to become a great company where every
person feels respected and challenged, can contribute in his or her own way, and learn and grow
as an individual and as a professional.
•
•
•
•

We build globally, we live locally. We harness the power and scale of our global
operations to deeply connect with the cities, communities, drivers and riders that we
serve, every day.
We are customer obsessed. We work tirelessly to earn our customers’ trust and business
by solving their problems, maximizing their earnings or lowering their costs. We surprise
and delight them. We make short-term sacrifices for a lifetime of loyalty.
We celebrate differences. We stand apart from the average. We ensure people of diverse
backgrounds feel welcome. We encourage different opinions and approaches to be heard,
and then we come together and build.
We do the right thing. Period.
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•
•
•
•

We act like owners. We seek out problems and we solve them. We help each other and
those who matter to us. We have a bias for action and accountability. We finish what we
start and we build Uber to last. And when we make mistakes, we’ll own up to them.
We persevere. We believe in the power of grit. We don’t seek the easy path. We look for
the toughest challenges and we push. Our collective resilience is our secret weapon.
We value ideas over hierarchy. We believe that the best ideas can come from anywhere,
both inside and outside our company. Our job is to seek out those ideas, to shape and
improve them through candid debate, and to take them from concept to action.
We make big bold bets. Sometimes we fail, but failure makes us smarter. We get back
up, we make the next bet, and we GO!5

The New York Times described the new set of core values under Khosrowshahi as “something
of a repudiation of the culture created under (previous CEO) Kalanick,” noting that the
company’s previously aggressive nature has led to business challenges serious enough to
threaten the company’s ability to operate in certain markets, including London.6
Under Kalanick, Uber’s mission had been to “make transportation as reliable as running water,
everywhere, for everyone.”7 Under Khosrowshahi’s leadership, the mission had transformed to
“ignit[ing] opportunity by setting the world in motion.” Uber’s website follows its mission with
the assertion that:
Good things happen when people can move, whether across town or towards their
dreams. Opportunities appear, open up, become reality. What started as a way to tap a
button to get a ride has led to billions of moments of human connection as people around
the world go all kinds of places in all kinds of ways with the help of our technology.8
Business and Strategies
Uber uses its technology platform for a variety of business purposes including ridesharing, food
delivery, personal mobility, and freight services. Uber’s largest business area is its “Rides”
segment, which includes the revenue it earns from its ridesharing platform and through leasing of
vehicles to third parties. The “Rides” segment accounted for over 75% of Uber’s reported
revenue in 2019. Uber’s second largest business area is its “Eats” segment, which earns revenue
through transactions on its UberEats platform via meal delivery services. The “Eats” segment
accounted for roughly 18% of Uber’s reported revenue in 2019. Collectively, Uber’s other
business areas, such as “Freight,” account for about 5% of the company’s revenue.
While Uber’s global headquarters is located in San Francisco, California, it operates many
regional offices around the world to support the cities and countries in which its services are
available. The company currently offers its services in the United States, Canada, Latin America,
Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In 2019, over 60% of Uber’s revenue came from
transactions in the United States and Canada. The next largest region in terms of revenue is the
combination of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, which contributed roughly 15% of Uber’s
revenue in 2019.9
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Since Uber’s inception in 2009, the company has drastically expanded beyond the simple
concept of “tap a button, get a ride.” While its ridesharing services still account for the prominent
portion of Uber’s business, the company has aggressively invested in diverse industries where it
believes it can leverage its technology to create value, including food delivery, logistics, and
urban mobility. Moreover, the company expresses a strong desire to continue growing its core
business, often citing that Uber “accounts for less than one percent of all miles driven
globally.”10 Uber cites nine “key elements of [its] growth strategy, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increasing Ridesharing penetration in existing markets;
Expanding Personal Mobility into new markets;
Continuing to invest in and expand Uber Eats;
Pursuing targeted investments and acquisitions;
Leveraging [its] platform to launch new products;
Increasing Driver and consumer engagement;
Continuing to invest in and expand Uber Freight;
Continuing to innovate and transform [its] products to meet platform user needs; and
Investing in advanced technologies, including autonomous vehicle technologies”11

Uber initially launched its services in the United States in 2010, but quickly expanded to Europe,
Australia, Latin America, India, Asia, the Middle East and Africa by 2013. Uber continued to
launch variations of its ridesharing services, introducing UberX in 2012 and UberPOOL in 2014.
In 2015, Uber began to strategically invest in areas like autonomous vehicles with its ATG
Launch in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania (US). In 2016, the company introduced the Uber Eats app and
launched Instant Pay while boasting completion of 1 billion trips. In its most recent history
leading up to its initial public offering, Uber began aggressively expanding its platform. In 2017,
the company launched Uber Freight and expanded Uber Eats to over 200 cities. The following
year, Uber launched Uber Pro, Express POOL, Uber Rewards, and Uber Cash. In 2017, the
company acquired JUMP and launched New Mobility (dockless e-bike and e-scooter business).
In March 2019 the company acquired its competitor in the Middle East, Careem, for $3.1 billion.
Careem operates in 120 cities across 15 countries, offering its internet platform for mobility,
delivery, and payments.12
PEOPLE
Top Management
Travis Kalanick, Co-Founder and Former CEO
Travis Kalanick became CEO of Uber in 2010, four months after its launch, when service was
only offered in San Francisco. He had entrepreneurial experience from two previous ventures
and a track record for raising significant capital for start-ups. However, as Uber grew, his tenure
was plagued by a series of highly public conflicts that eventually led to his ouster.
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On the heels of the presidential election of Donald Trump, Kalanick secured a seat on the
President’s technology council, an association with which many Uber employees expressed
dissatisfaction. On January 29, 2017, Trump instituted a travel ban targeting Muslims, sparking
protests at many airports, including JFK International Airport in New York. Uber turned off
surge pricing in the area of the airport, which many members of the public interpreted as an
attempt by Uber to profit off of the ban and protests. A digital #deleteUber campaign resulted in
at least 500,000 users deleting their Uber accounts in the span of days, not counting users who
only deleted the app without deleting their accounts. Mike Isaac, a journalist who has covered
Uber extensively, suggested that “to #deleteUber wasn’t just to remove a ride-hailing app from
one’s phone. It was also to give a giant middle finger to greed, to ‘bro culture,’ to Big Tech—to
everything the app stood for.”13 Kalanick resigned from Trump’s council shortly thereafter.14
On February 19, 2017, a former Uber employee, Susan Fowler, wrote an extensive blog article
that documented her “one very, very strange year at Uber,” during which, on her first day of
work, she claimed she was sexually harassed by her direct supervisor over the company’s instant
messaging app, uChat. Despite her immediate report of this incident to human resources staff,
the supervisor in question was not reprimanded or fired. Instead, Fowler was encouraged to look
for another team to join within the company. She did so, but also began to hear accounts from
other female employees which suggested that sexual harassment and discrimination were more
widespread at the company than her experience initially suggested. Fowler’s blog post
encouraged current and former employees to step forward with their complaints of a similar
nature. Many upset Uber employees subsequently left and found work with companies like
Airbnb, Facebook and Uber’s direct competitor, Lyft.15
On February 28, Kalanick was caught on camera yelling at an Uber driver who complained about
changes in Uber’s fee structure. The footage circulated widely in the media. By June 21, 2017,
Kalanick had resigned as Uber’s CEO, but remained on the company’s board.
Dara Khosrowshahi, Current Uber CEO
Kalanick was replaced by Dara Khosrowshahi, who previously served as CEO of online travel
website Expedia for 12 years. Expedia’s holdings include Hotels.com, Trivago, and Travelocity,
all of which operate as online travel booking sites. Prior to leading Expedia, Khosrowshahi
served as the chief financial officer of IAC, a conglomerate of “various consumer-facing online
businesses, including video-sharing website Vimeo, the Daily Beast, Investopedia, and Match
Group’s brands including Match and Tinder.”16 IAC purchased Expedia in 2003 and placed
Khosrowshahi at the helm in 2005. Since then, Expedia’s stock price increased 500%, with much
of the company’s growth stemming from acquisitions, including that of Orbitz for $1.6 billion in
2015.17
Having emigrated from Iran as a child, Khosrowshahi graduated from Brown University with a
background in engineering, self-describes as a “sci-fi geek,” and generally maintained a low
profile during his time at IAC and Expedia.18 Those who know him describe him as “what you
see is what you get,” “a person of substance,” and “very steady,” and he has not been shy about
commenting on matters of immigration or criticizing President Donald Trump for failing to “rise
to the expectations of his office.”19
4

Despite his strong professional performance and relatively noncontroversial standing in the
technology industry, Khosrowshahi was the third choice of Uber’s board of directors in a highly
contentious selection process for Travis Kalanick’s replacement. He landed the role only after
Hewlett Packard Enterprise CEO Meg Whitman withdrew her name from consideration and
General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt was eliminated over concerns about his company’s recent
stagnation.20 Much of the first two years of Khosrowshahi’s time at Uber was spent on an
“apology tour” to repair relationships with drivers and cities across the globe.21
Biographical briefs of other company executives can be found in Exhibit 1.
Board Leadership
The discord among Uber’s board of directors leading up to Khosrowshahi’s appointment in
August 2017 was followed in September by former CEO Travis Kalanick’s unilateral
appointment of two new directors: Ursula Burns, former CEO of Xerox Corp., and John Thain,
the ex-leader of Merrill Lynch.22 Just a month later, the board approved governance changes
offered by Khosrowshahi and Goldman Sachs, an Uber investor. The changes resulted in the loss
of special voting privileges for shareholders, including Kalanick.23 According to the New York
Times, this change “paved the way for a sale of some stock to the Japanese conglomerate
SoftBank and for the company to go public by 2019.”24 A full board roster is included in Exhibit
2, and a brief on Uber’s major investors can be found in Exhibit 3.
Employees
During Travis Kalanick’s tenure, Uber presented the quintessential image of an up-and-coming
tech giant: a work-hard, play-hard culture where long hours were expected. Kalanick gave
employees a great deal of latitude in conducting business, which made sense for a global
business establishing footholds in a wide variety of locales. However, since instinct drove many
of his hiring decisions, Kalanick led a fairly homogenous company—predominantly young,
white, and male.25 Employee evaluations were “problematically arbitrary,” with minimal
required justification from managers. Since employees were evaluated against the company’s
core values, it was possible to receive a poor evaluation for “lack of ‘hustle.’”26 Even more
problematically, Uber offices worldwide were rife with aggressive behavior, sexism and abuse,
often in a party environment fueled by alcohol and drug use. In Thailand, a female employee
abstaining from drug use complained that she was pushed facedown onto a table by her manager
and forced to inhale cocaine.27 Apparently, the promise of personal success that would come
from the company’s growth pushed many to “white-knuckle it through the bad times.”28
A blog post published in February 2017 by a former Uber employee, Susan Fowler, publicly
belied Uber’s systemic discrimination and harassment. Her account of being sexually harassed
on her first day with the company and subsequently having her complaints dismissed by
superiors were echoed by many employees. Ultimately, Uber had to engage more than one law
firm, including that of former Attorney General Eric Holder, to investigate and make
recommendations in response to at least 215 complaints.29
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Drivers
Writer and journalist Adam Lashinsky documented the ease with which he signed up to become
a driver in his book Wild Ride. It took 15 minutes to submit basic information and authorization
for a background check online. Lashinsky then took his car to his local Uber inspection center
where his vehicle received a “cursory once-over” to check basics like seatbelts and taillights. The
Uber representative “verified [his] auto insurance and vehicle registration, helped [him]
download the rider app onto [his] phone, and issued [him] a permit to display in [his] window
when [he] picked up or dropped off at local airports.”30 By the time Lashinsky left with his
welcome packet of Uber logo stickers for his car, approximately one hour had passed since he
started the process.31 As easily as one can begin working as an Uber driver, one can stop – one
study found that one in six app-based gig workers “is new in a given month, and more than half
of participants quit within a given year.”32
In the period from January 2015 through March 2017, Uber reported 1,877,252 people who had
driven through UberX or UberPOOL in 196 cities; many drivers work for more than one
platform, including Uber’s competitor, Lyft.33 Many drivers were immigrants from developing
countries who were willing to work extremely long hours for relatively low pay.34 An analysis in
2015 found that “51 percent of Uber drivers work one to 15 hours per week, 30 percent work 16
to 34 hours per week, while 12 percent work 35 to 49 hours per week, and 7 percent work 50
hours or more per week.”35 This does not account for hours worked through other platforms. One
study of Uber’s driver population categorized drivers as one of the following:
•
•
•

Hobbyists (casual gig workers)
Part-time drivers, who may value “income during career transitions,” flexibility, or a
“good bad job” due to “a criminal record or limited education”36
Full-time drivers, some of whom even lease expensive luxury cars to participate in
uberBlack or uberSUV, who “used to make money, before rate cuts that Uber
implemented in January 2017”37

A 2016 Pew Research Center survey reported that 56 percent of surveyed gig workers financially
rely on gig work income, while 42 percent considered themselves “casual” gig workers who
“report that they could live comfortably” without the income from gigging.38 The variation in
drivers’ reliance on gig income does cause friction among drivers. Since part-time drivers and
especially hobbyists are less reliant on this income, they can “function a bit like scabs,” or
workers who step in to do the work of striking laborers, in the eyes of “occupational drivers
trying to support their families.”39
Rider ratings serve as the primary means of drivers’ performance evaluation. Through the Uber
app, riders rate their drivers after the completion of the ride. While this system supports
efficiency through “the semi-automated management of large, disaggregated workforces,”
researchers have questioned the implications of this approach.40 One concern is that the implicit
biases that riders may have against some groups based on race, gender, age, or other factors may
influence ratings, which could in turn influence employment decisions by management.41
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A nine-month study identified “information and power asymmetries” as a result of the Uber app
are “fundamental to its ability to structure control over [Uber’s] workers.”42 Some drivers have
speculated that Uber’s algorithm “rewards drivers implicitly for following behavioral
prompts…although the explicit dispatching rule is that passengers are matched with the nearest
driver.”43
Uber does not directly supervise drivers, instead offering suggestions and recommendations
through the app, leading with phrases like “riders give the best ratings to drivers who…”44
Critics argue that the degree of indirect control that Uber exerts over drivers negates the firm’s
assertion that drivers are “independent contractors and entrepreneurs,” in that they are expected
to “deliver a standardized experience to passengers or risk suspension, deactivation, or loss of
pay.”45
Some problems with drivers are more serious, including reports of “physical assault, kidnapping,
sexual assault and rape” in at least seven countries including the United States, some of which
involved drivers who were known felons who managed to pass Uber background checks.46
Generally, Uber has argued that it has no liability because drivers are independent contractors.47
CHANGES UNDER KHOSROWSHAHI
Since the departure of Kalanick, Uber has worked to evolve its culture and workplace
environment.
Diversity and Inclusion
Just days before Kalanick’s resignation from Uber in June 2017, board member David
Bonderman also resigned after making a sexist joke at a company-wide meeting convened to
address allegations of sexual harassment at the company.48 As Khosrowshahi took the helm, he
hired the company’s first chief diversity officer, Bo Young Lee, and reviewed salaries of all
employees to ensure fair pay.49
In March 2018, Uber settled a $10 million class action suit filed by 400 current and former
employees who were women and people of color. The suit claimed that these employees had
been “passed over for promotions and were paid less than other workers for doing the same job,
and that managers had created a hostile work environment.” In addition to payment, settlement
also required a promise from the Uber to “revamp pay practices and provide mentoring to female
employees and workers of color.”50 In July, Uber’s human resources director, Liane Hornsey
resigned, and was replaced by Nikki Krishnamurthy in October. Like Dara Khosrowshahi,
Krishnamurthy came to Uber from Expedia, where she had headed human resources.
Uber’s Diversity and Inclusion report for 2019 highlighted specific goals that had been
integrated into executive performance evaluations and compensation. For several senior leaders,
these goals included increasing the proportion of women and underrepresented employees above
35% and 14%, respectively, at specified organizational levels by 2022.51 To support these goals,
Uber’s human resource systems were modified to include improved manager training and efforts
to reduce bias in interview processes. Other tools deployed included diversity scorecards and
7

diversity and inclusion audits. The company also piloted a variety of “sponsorship” models to
cultivate and support emerging talent in its technology and operations business units. Uber then
scaled these efforts to implementation across the entire company to “[ensure] that historically
underrepresented talent is supported and that our leaders are learning new skills to become better
champions for diversity.”52
From 2018 to 2019, Uber made some documentable progress toward a more diverse workplace.
The population of female employees increased 42.3%, and in the United States, the population of
black employees grew 44.5%, while the population of Latin employees grew 73.5%. In all cases,
Uber reported that this growth was “most notable” in its technology business unit.53
Employee Education
Uber has begun offering opportunities for continuing education to both corporate employees and
drivers. In partnership with Harvard Business School Online, Uber offers corporate employees
who are “current and aspiring leaders” access to executive education courses focused on
“culture, leadership and inclusion.”54 The company has also initiated partnerships to help hone
the technological, engineering, and entrepreneurial skills of college students and recent college
graduates, particularly women and people of color; this also serves to identify and cultivate
potential Uber hires.
Uber’s first efforts to provide drivers access to continuing education began in the United
Kingdom through a program called Level Up, which it claims is “the first education program
solely dedicated to developing job skills for those working in the gig economy.”55 Currently, the
program offers 300 online courses and 30 degree-level scholarships to Uber Eats delivery
partners. In the United States, the company has partnered with Arizona State University online
“to provide eligible drivers, delivery partners or their families the opportunity to complete
courses toward an undergraduate degree or non-degree certificate…with tuition fully covered,”
and with the stated goal of scaling this kind of program globally.56
Business Practices
Uber’s business conduct guide was made publicly available through its website in November
2019. The document outlines guidelines for ethical decision-making and behavior for Uber
employees. The language throughout the guide emphasizes doing the right thing, creating an
inclusive work environment, respect for privacy, and respectful, ethical interactions with
business partners, competitors, regulators, and government representatives.57 As with many large
companies, Uber has a “war room,” a physical space at its headquarters that serves as a center for
strategy, particularly with regard to competitors. In 2019, one author reported that Uber’s war
room, which was previously “used to combat archrival Lyft and camouflage its operations from
the eyes of transportation regulators, was recently renamed the ‘peace room’” in light of the
company’s negative publicity.58
In 2018, Uber announced mandated six-hour driver breaks, a policy similar to that used by taxi
commissions.59 To address issues related to driver-instigated violence, Uber has added a “panic
button” to the version of its app available in the United States.60
8

Employee Response
In January 2019, an Uber employee survey conducted in October 2018 was leaked to the press.
This iteration of the 35-question semi-annual survey was completed by 18,648 employees. While
many questions on the survey showed in an increase in positive responses for most questions, a
few questions directly related to workplace culture did not. Survey results are included in Exhibit
4.61
INSIDE UBER
Communications
For internal corporate communications, Uber previously relied on an app called HipChat. In
2019, it was reported that Uber had launched a proprietary chat app called uChat, which was
developed in response to problems the company encountered with HipChat in handling the
volume of messages employees sent on a daily basis. uChat reportedly has the ability to handle
70,000 simultaneous users and send up to one million messages daily.62
While Uber can communicate with drivers directly through its app, drivers do not have an
official means of communicating with one another. Instead, drivers who do connect with one
another for “workplace culture and information-sharing” reach each other through online forums;
since drivers in forums can log on from any number of locations, there is “no centralized local
basis for worker organization or power.”63
Uber’s direct communication with drivers has in some instances taken the form of print
periodicals. The first publication, called Momentum, launched in 2015 and focused on helpful
tips for drivers, such as how to exercise behind the wheel.64 A new publication, Vehicle,
launched in 2018 that focused primarily on drivers’ stories, their reasons for driving and the
communities in which they live. Vehicle also had a web-based presence. Both publications
focused print distribution to a few specific major cities in the United States.65
Marketing
Uber markets its service both to drivers and riders and uses geographic segmentation to version
its app and marketing messages for specific countries like India, China, and the United Kingdom.
For example, a United Kingdom-based campaign highlighted the various uses of Uber, while in
India, a 2016 “Moving Forward” campaign aimed to “demonstrate how freedom of mobility
could provide both drivers and riders alike a higher standard of living” through billboards, print
advertising, and digital films.66 After the debut of the digital film series, approximately 50,000
individuals signed up as Uber drivers.67
After the hiring of Khosrowshahi as CEO in 2017, Uber launched a different “Moving Forward”
campaign that sought to highlight the company’s revitalized culture and promise to do the right
thing. A year later in 2018, the company launched a campaign called “Doors are Always
Opening” that relied on digital and outdoor media. According to Uber’s executive creative
9

director, Paulie Dery, the message of the “purely emotional” campaign was that “opportunity
happens everywhere if you are willing to move…We've always had a certain amount of hustle
and belief that movement creates something better for everybody, and that's really at the center
of the idea.”68
Operations
Uber’s primary business are design, engineering, operations, and product.69 Its operations have
been challenged by conflict with partners and regulators. For example, under Kalanick, Uber
actively attempted to deceive Apple about a component of its app’s coding that would
circumvent user privacy. Apple detected this deception and a series of tense conversations
among the two companies’ leadership ensued before the issue was resolved.70
Part of Uber’s conflict with regulators and government agencies is that its business model does
not fit with regulations that govern traditional taxi businesses. This has led to attempts on Uber’s
part to directly or indirectly influence such regulations. Uber’s domestic lobbying efforts have
involved “nearly 400 paid lobbyists across forty-four states; the number of ride-hailing lobbyists
outnumbered the paid lobbying staffs of Amazon, Microsoft and Walmart combined.”71 In
Philadelphia, the firm faced a $12 million fine for 120,000 violations of transit code for
operating illegally, a matter eventually settled for $3.5 million.72
Internationally, Uber failed to legalize its uberPOP service in the Netherlands, which some
researchers ascribe to the firm’s continued operations while concurrently lobbying for revised
regulation.73 In 2017, the United States Justice Department began an examination of allegations
that Uber violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act through payment of bribes in foreign
countries to operate its ride-hailing service. In April 2019, this process had yet to reach
resolution as noted in filings related to the company’s impending IPO.74
In Arizona in March 2018, a self-driving Uber vehicle hit and killed a pedestrian. Just months
into his leadership of the company, Khosrowshahi halted the firm’s autonomous vehicle
operations. In a public statement, he reflected on the incident, stating that, “if you think about us
as a transportation platform, then our number one priority this year is standing for safety…We
have to stand for the content of our platforms. That means we have to know who our drivers are
and we have to be open and fair. We can't just say we're a platform and our job is done." 75
Autonomous vehicle operations resumed in some cities before the end of 2018.
Data Management
In order to provide its services, Uber collects a variety of data on drivers and riders, including
user movement, drivers’ license and insurance information and riders’ contact and payment
information. Internally, a mechanism for employees to track the movement of riders was called
“god view,” but was later renamed “heaven view.”76 This data was necessary to the delivery of
service, though one journalist expressed surprise over “how loosely Uber restricted internal
access to the tool.”77
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Uber also leveraged its data to track those who might threaten the firm’s operations in a
particular locale through the use of “Greyball.” This feature was “a snippet of code affixed to a
user’s Uber account…that identified that person as a threat to the company. It could be a police
officer, a legislative aide, or…a transportation official.”78 If a user had their account flagged in
this manner, they could only view a falsified version of the app “populated with ghost cars.”79
In September 2016, Uber experienced a data breach affecting the data of 57 million customers,
including names, email addresses and phone numbers. The information of about 7 million drivers
was also accessed, including 600,000 United States driver’s license numbers. Under Kalanick,
Uber paid $100,000 to the hackers at the direction of Chief Security Officer Joe Sullivan in
exchange for the deletion of the stolen data. Funds were routed through Uber’s “bug bounty
program,” which was intended to work with friendly hackers to expose weaknesses in
technological assets. The per-bug payout limit for that program was $10,000. Though Kalanick
received news of this breach in November 2016, this intrusion was made public a year later after
Khosrowshahi became CEO. This delay violated California laws that required notification “in
the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.”80 Khosrowshahi made public
statements about the hack and its resolution after he learned of it. He also fired Sullivan and one
other employee.81
Financial Status
Uber’s initial public offering in May of 2019 was highly anticipated by investors; however, it has
now made its mark as the “worst first-day performance for a giant U.S. IPO by a wide margin”.
Shares of Uber’s stock ended its first day down $3.40, or 7.6% from its offering price of $45.82
Share price continued to drop roughly 30% from May 2019 to November 2019, with shares
priced at $31.08 as of November 4, 2019. In the third quarter of 2019, Uber generated $3.8B in
revenue, up 29.5% from the previous year. Costs and expenses for the third quarter of 2019
totaled $4.9B, leaving Uber with an operating loss of $1.1B. Uber’s financials are found in
Exhibits 5, 6, and 7.
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Rise of the Gig Economy
The modern version of the term “gig economy” can be traced back to 1996 with the launch of
Craigslist, but began to garner mainstream attention around the 2008 financial crisis in the
United States.83 Independent contracting and short-term labor is nothing new, but the huge
investments made by early adopters of the business model, including Uber, are most certainly a
modern phenomenon. Technological advancements have proven to be a major driving force
behind the growth of the modern gig economy. Rapidly expanding access to high-powered
mobile phones and the explosion of social media users connected workers looking for flexible
job opportunities with consumers that increasingly demanded quick, easy access to services.84
The gig economy has continued to thrive and is larger than ever; in 2017, the CEO of Intuit, Brad
Smith, stated “The gig economy [in the US] … is now estimated to be about 34% of the
workforce and expected to be 43% by the year 2020”.85 By 2018, approximately 150 million
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workers in North America and Western Europe left the mainstream workforce to pursue work as
independent contractors.86
Are Drivers Employees?
Ride-sharing apps (Uber, Lyft) have been a large part of the growth of the modern gig economy.
As such, they rely heavily on the designation of their workers as independent contractors. The
independent contractor designation is generally viewed as benefiting the employer. It allows
employers to avoid certain expenses that would be associated with full-time employees, such as
social security and Medicare taxes (in the US), overtime and minimum wage payments, and
other traditional employee benefits.87 A major trend that has potentially widespread implications
for the future of the gig economy, and especially ride-sharing apps, is a push by certain state
lawmakers to force a far more narrow definition of which employment types can be classified as
independent contractors. On September 18, 2019, California became the first state to pass
legislation aimed at limiting the scope of the independent contractor designation.88 The new
California law, Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), will take effect in January, 2020 and establishes a test
for organizations that wish to classify their employees as independent contractors. The
requirements include:
1. The worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with
the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and
in fact
2. The worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business
3. The worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as the work performed89
Self-driving Cars
Self-driving cars are another global phenomenon that will likely have an impact on Uber’s
industry in the future. The concept of a self-driving car traces its roots back as far as the 1920s,
but the first fully autonomous cars weren’t built and ready for testing until the 1980s.90 However,
progress was minimal until companies like Google began designing and building self-driving
cars around 2009. By 2018, Google’s self-driving car project, Waymo, had logged more than 2
million miles.91 By 2019, most of the major car companies have made significant investments in
the quickly progressing autonomous vehicle industry. It has been estimated that the autonomous
vehicle industry could be as large as $550 billion by 202692 and there could be as many as 20.8
million autonomous vehicles on the road by 2030.93
INDUSTRY COMPETITION
Expected to reach $300B worldwide by 2030,94 the ridesharing market is growing globally
thanks to the spread of app-based transportation network services – or ridesharing – as
alternatives to taxis, car ownership, and other traditional means of transportation. Ridesharing is
growing especially fast in developing markets where mobile connectivity is widespread but
individual car ownership is low.95 In general, users prefer the ease of use and low fares offered
by transportation network companies over traditional cabs and public transit. These companies
12

differentiate their service by maximizing car liquidity, or the quantity of drivers and their
proximity to riders, to keep users engaged with their platforms.96
Taxis
In the United States, cities maintain regulatory oversight over taxis, although the operation of
taxi businesses falls to individual drivers or private companies. Municipalities issue a limited
number of licenses that permit the operation of a single cab. The restricted supply of licenses has
traditionally made the licenses valuable assets that are often only affordable to wealthy private
investors or large cab companies. Owners of the licenses then lease the right to operate a taxi to a
driver. For example, in New York City licenses are referred to as medallions and are issued by
the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC).97 The Taxi and Limousine
Commission has restricted the number of taxicabs in operation to approximately 13,500, helping
the valuation of individual medallions reach over $1M as recently as 2014. The Taxi and
Limousine Commission is also responsible for setting predetermined fares and additional charges
for all taxis in the city.98
The introduction of ridesharing companies that leverage private vehicles and digital dispatch
technology has disrupted the taxi industry. From 2014 to 2018, ride-hailing grew from 8% of all
business traveler ground transportation to 70.5%.99 The digital coordination of riders with an
uncapped number of drivers has generally led to lower prices and better service outside of
densely populated urban centers.100 Customers also find the app-based ridesharing platforms to
be more enjoyable, agreeing to fares up front and handling all booking and payment through the
app.101
In localities across the globe, taxi drivers and cab company owners have organized to lobby
against the proliferation of ridesharing drivers who do not own municipal permits to operate
cabs. Governments, sympathetic to the plight of taxicab drivers, and susceptible to powerful taxi
lobbies, have moved to protect existing taxi companies by prohibiting Uber from operating or
forcing Uber to comply with various rules and regulations.102 In many cases, these interest
groups assert Uber is operating an illegal taxi-cab service and want Uber regulated accordingly.
This would potentially require Uber to cap its number of drivers and set predetermined fares
instead of using it dynamic market modeling. Uber has often responded aggressively in these
markets, taking to social media or even spurring action by its riders through its app.103
Lyft
Founded in 2012 and based in San Francisco, Lyft is Uber’s largest competitor in the United
States, with an estimated 27% share of the US ride-hailing market.104 Its revenue has grown sixfold since 2016, reaching $2.16B in 2018.105 Its Q2 2019 revenue was up 62% from the same
quarter the prior year106 while Uber’s grew 14% during the same period.107 The ridesharing
company operates in 300 markets in the United States and Canada but has not expanded outside
of North America.108 As of 2019, Lyft does not offer food delivery, commercial freight, or
fintech services. The company has, however, formed a partnership with Waymo that permitted
Lyft the use of ten autonomous minivans in Phoenix, AZ.109
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Although the company is expected to continue its rapid growth, Lyft struggles with profitability.
To grow its supply of drivers, Lyft also uses driver referral bonuses and incentives. These
factors, combined with low ride clearing prices, have kept the start-up unprofitable. Its 2018
revenue of $2.16B was offset with $3.1B in costs, resulting in $911M in losses.110 In 2018, it
gave 620M rides and had 18.6M active riders, which the company defines as a person taking at
least one ride in a quarter.111
DiDi
Formed in 2012 by a former Alibaba employee, Cheng Wei, DiDi is a Chinese ridesharing
service valued at $62B. Like Uber, the company offers a variety of services that include
ridesharing, food delivery, and carpooling. Users can also purchase car insurance and personal
loans through the DiDi Finance app. 112 As of 2019, DiDi is reported to have 550 million riders
and over 31 million drivers.113
In 2016, the company purchased Uber China in a deal valued at $35B. The deal came after
intense competition between DiDi and Uber, who entered the Chinese market only a year prior.
It’s estimated Uber spent about $2B in China in efforts to overcome local regulations and attract
drivers and riders to its platform. Ultimately, Uber merged its Chinese operations with Didi in
exchange for a 17.7% stake in the Chinese company.114
Due to the fierce competition Uber has faced in some markets, it has made various other deals
like the DiDi deal. In 2017, Uber formed a joint venture with Yandex, a Russian ridesharing
service, whereby it took a 38% stake in the company.115 Uber spent $2.28B for a 28% stake in
Grab in 2018, a Singapore-based company operating in Southeast Asian markets including
Indonesia and Malaysia.116 The company now has an estimated valuation of $14B,117 an 85%
increase since Uber exited. Grab is estimated to have 36 million users and gives 4 million rides a
day.118 Uber withdrew from each market in a cost cutting effort and to focus on markets with less
competition and friendlier regulations.
Ola
Despite its difficulties in other Asian markets, Uber has not withdrawn from the ridesharing
market in India. It started operations in India three years after its main competitor in India, Ola
Cabs, was founded in Bengaluru, India. With $30.4B in revenue, India is the third largest
ridesharing market behind China and the United States. Due to poor infrastructure, low car
ownership, and low mobile connectivity in areas outside of urban centers, user penetration in the
ridesharing marketplace has been relatively low (12.7%).119 This is changing rapidly thanks to
expanding mobile networks, increased competition by Uber and Ola, and alternatives to
automobiles. In 2015, Uber invested in an engineering hub in Bangalore citing the availability of
homegrown talent in the tech sector and the opportunity to gain experience in emerging markets
with new technical challenges.120 Both companies have made large investments in alternative
modes of transportation more suited to the congestion of Indian cities. Ola purchased Vogo, a
scooter rental company, for $100M in 2018.121 Uber has partnered with Yulu, an e-bicycle
company, and its users can access it through the Uber app.122 Ola is in 150 Indian cities and plans
to enter another 300 in 2020.123 In 2017, Ola was reported to have 56% of the Indian ridesharing
market.124
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THE FUTURE
Even as Uber grows, it struggles to reach profitability. Legal and regulatory challenges are as
numerous and diverse as the locations in which the company operates and bear significant
implications for Uber’s financial outlook, especially regarding the employment status of drivers.
Internal stakeholders face uncertainty as the company works to rehabilitate a troubled culture and
address issues of diversity and inclusion. The broad environment is rife with direct competition
and the threat of potential competition through technological advances.
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Exhibit 1. Biographies of Uber Staff Leadership (Abridged from Company Website)
Nelson Chai, Chief Financial Officer
Chai previously served as CEO for the warranty and insurance company, Warranty Group. His
prior experience includes serving as President of CIT Group, Chief Financial Officer of Merrill
Lynch & Co., NYSE Euronext, and Archipelago Holdings. Having earned his B.A. in Economics
at the University of Pennsylvania and an M.B.A. from the Harvard Business School, Chai
currently serves as a board member of the U.S. Fund for UNICEF, the University of
Pennsylvania School of Arts and Sciences, and Thermo Fisher Scientific.
Tony West, Chief Legal Officer
West oversees legal, compliance, ethics and security functions for Uber. In addition to serving as
the Executive Vice President of Public Policy and Government Affairs for PepsiCo, West has
also served as Associate Attorney General of the United States and Assistant Attorney General of
the Civil Division of the United States Justice Department during the Obama administration.
Early career experience included serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in California’s
Northern District, Special Assistant Attorney General in California’s Department of Justice, and
as a litigation partner at a private firm. He attended Harvard College for his undergraduate
studies and earned a law degree from Stanford Law.
Nikki Krishnamurthy, Chief People Officer
Krishnamurthy is responsible for human resources, recruiting, workplace, and diversity and
inclusion teams. She held the same role at Expedia prior to joining Uber’s leadership. While at
Expedia, she also headed Expedia Local Expert, a global service focused on travel experiences.
Holding a B.A. in Psychology from Rutgers University, she has also served in human resources
with WaMu and PNC Financial Services Group.
Manik Gupta, Chief Product Officer
Gupta transitioned into this role having previously served as the leader of Uber’s Marketplace
and Maps product teams. Prior experience includes more than seven years at Google Maps,
management of Hewlett-Packard’s e-commerce in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and
founding an e-commerce startup that was acquired by a Norwegian firm. Gupta completed
undergraduate studies in computer engineering at Nanyang Technological University and earned
an M.B.A. from the Indian School of Business.
Thuan Pham, Chief Technology Officer
Pham leads Uber’s engineering team. Holding a B.S. in computer science and engineering and an
M.S. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, Pham has previously served as
Vice President of Engineering for VMware, Westbridge, and DoubleClick.
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Andrew Macdonald, Senior Vice President, Global Rides & Platform
Macdonald previously served as Uber’s Vice President for the firm’s operations in the Americas
as well as its Global Business Development unit. Prior to joining Uber, he founded two start-ups
after having served as a management consultant focused on technology, finance and
manufacturing for Bain & Company. He serves on the Advisory Council for a university
business incubator in Canada called Ryerson DMZ.
Pierre-Dimitri Gore-Coty, Vice President, International Rides
Gore-Coty oversees Uber’s business in more than 60 countries, having previously served as Vice
President of the ride-hailing business unit in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He has been
with Uber since its first international foray (France) in 2012. His prior experience included time
at Goldman Sachs, having created a hedge fund while in his mid-20s. Gore-Coty serves as an
Executive Sponsor of the Women of Uber Employee Resource Group.
Jason Droege, Vice President, Uber Everything
Droege was responsible for the first Uber app that extended beyond ride-hailing: Uber Eats.
More generally, he leads the business development unit of the organization that works to
leverage Uber’s existing technology. His prior experience focused on internet-based services and
commerce as well as enterprise software, and he attended the University of California in Los
Angeles.
Rachel Holt, Vice President, New Mobility
Holt leads JUMP, an electric bike share service, and Uber’s business related to scooters, transit,
and hourly rentals. She previously served as Uber’s General Manager for the United States and
Canada. Holt began her time with the company as Uber’s General Manager in Washington, D.C.
Her early career included time with Bain & Company with a focus on private equity, media and
health care, before working in brand management for Clorox. She completed undergraduate
studies at Amherst College and an M.B.A. at Stanford University.
Eric Meyhofer, Head of Advanced Technologies Group
Meyhofer has a background in technology entrepreneurism and education. His start-up ventures
focused on applications of robotics including 3D mapping and high-powered lasers. He is a cofounder of Uber’s Advanced Technologies Group and served as a Special Faculty member for
more than a decade at Carnegie Mellon University’s Robotics Institute.
Jill Hazelbaker, Senior Vice President, Marketing and Public Affairs
Hazelbaker leads Uber’s worldwide marketing, communications and public policy efforts,
having held a similar role at Snap. Her prior experience includes handling public and
government relations across Europe, as well as public relations in the Middle East and Africa,
having begun her Google career in its Corporate Communications department. Earlier in her
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career, she led a worked on a number of political campaigns at various levels of government,
most notably including her experience as National Communications Director and Chief
Spokesperson for U.S. Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2008.
Bo Young Lee, Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer
Lee leads Uber’s efforts to create a more diverse and inclusive environment in partnership with a
variety of stakeholders. Her directive is to develop a workplace culture that can empower both
employees and the company as a whole to grow. She previously served in a similar role for two
business units of the Marsh and McLennan Companies. She was a founding consultant for
Aon/Hewitt Associates’ Global Emerging Workforce Solutions and led diversity efforts at Ernst
& Young and National Grid. She has consulted for a number of international organizations, both
for-profit and non-profit, on diversity and inclusion issues. She earned a B.B.A. from the Ross
School of Business at the University of Michigan and an M.B.A. from the Stern School of
Business at New York University.
Source: Uber Newsroom, 2019. Leadership profiles and board of directors.
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/leadership/, Accessed November 20, 2019.
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Exhibit 2. Uber’s Board of Directors (from company website as of November 4, 2019)
Ronald Sugar, Board Chair
Former Chairperson and CEO of Northrop Grumman
H.E. Yasir Al-Rumayyan
Managing Director of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund
Ursula Burns
CEO and Chairman of VEON
Garrett Camp
Co-founder of Uber and Founder of Expa
Travis Kalanick
Co-founder and Former CEO of Uber
Dara Khosrowshahi
CEO of Uber
Wan Ling Martello
Executive Vice President of Nestlé
John Thain
Former Chairman and CEO of CIT Group
David Trujillo
Partner at TPG Capital
Source: Uber Newsroom, 2019. Leadership profiles and board of directors.
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/leadership/, Accessed November 20, 2019.
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Exhibit 3. Uber’s Major Shareholders
Uber’s most significant shareholder prior to IPO:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Matt Cohler, a venture capitalist on the board of Benchmark Capital, owned in excess of
150 million shares through the firm (11% of Uber).
Travis Kalanick, Uber’s co-founder and immediate past CEO, owned 117.5 million
shares (8.6% of Uber).
Garrett Camp, technically Uber’s founder who created the app that Kalanick invested in,
owned 82 million shares (6% of Uber).
H.E. Yasir Al-Rumayyan is Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund’s managing director,
who, through the fund, owned 73 million shares (5.4% of Uber).
Ryan Graves, Uber’s first employee who maintained board membership though he had
since ended his employment, owned 33.2 million shares (2.4% of Uber).
Other board members who own Uber stock include CEO Dara Khosrowshahi with
196,000 shares, Huffington Post founder Ariana Huffington with 22,000 shares, and CIT
Group’s former chairman and CEO John Thain with 130,000 shares.
Companies with major shareholdings include Google (5% of Uber) and SoftBank
(16.3%).

Source: Klebnikov, S. 2019. Uber could be worth $100 billion after its IPO. Here’s who stands to
make the most money. Money. April 12. http://money.com/money/5641631/uber-ipobillionaires/, Accessed November 20, 2019.
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Exhibit 4. Results of Leaked Uber Employee Survey from October 2018
Uber reportedly surveys its employees every six months. Responses to individual survey questions
could be positive, neutral, or negative. According to USA Today and Business Insider, the
following questions garnered a more favorable response in October 2018 than in the previous
administration
of
the
survey:
Statement
I believe that Uber is in a position to succeed over the next two years
I feel heard by my manager
I feel secure about my job
I feel fairly treated
Uber acts in a socially responsible way
I feel the work I’m doing is meaningful and impactful
I have access to the learning and development needed to do my job well
I feel excited to come to work every day
I see myself working at Uber in two years’ time
I am able to manage my work stress in a healthy way
Even if offered a competitive offer or external career opportunity, I
would choose to stay at Uber
I believe my total compensation (base salary, bonuses, benefits, equity)
is fair, relative to similar roles at other companies

Employees
Responding
Positively
83%
73%
66%
63%
63%
63%
60%
58%
56%
56%
45%
40%

Questions with a decreased percentage of favorable responses when compared to the previous
survey reportedly included:
Statement
I am passionate about Uber’s mission
I feel I can report ethical or compliance violations without fear of
retaliation
I have seen positive culture change take place at Uber over the past six
months

Employees
Responding
Positively
77%
71%
62%

Source: Meyer, Z. 2019. Uber employees’ feelings about the company revealed in leaked worker
survey. USA Today. January 1. https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/01/01/uberemployees-leaked-survey/2457260002/, Accessed November 20, 2019.
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Exhibit 5: Uber’s Consolidated Statements of Operations, Third Quarter 2019
Three Months Ended September 30,
2018

Revenue
Costs and expenses
Cost of revenue, exclusive of depreciation and
amortization shown separately below
Operations and support
Sales and marketing
Research and development
General and administrative
Depreciation and amortization
Total costs and expenses
Loss from operations
Interest expense
Other income (expense), net
Income (loss) before income taxes and loss from
equity method investment
Provision for income taxes
Loss from equity method investment, net of tax
Net income (loss) including non-controlling interests
Less: net income (loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests, net of tax
Net income (loss) attributable to Uber Technologies,
Inc.
Net income (loss) per share attributable to Uber
Technologies, Inc. common stockholders:
Basic
Diluted
Weighted-average shares used to compute net
income (loss) per share attributable to common
stockholders:
Basic
Diluted

$

Nine Months Ended September 30,

2019

2,944

$

2018

3,813

$

2019

8,296

$

10,078

1,510
387
785
434
460
131
3,707
(763)
(161)
(54)

1,860
498
1,113
755
591
102
4,919
(1,106)
(90)
49

4,008
1,108
2,177
1,139
1,527
317
10,276
(1,980)
(453)
4,946

5,281
1,796
3,375
4,228
2,652
371
17,703
(7,625)
(458)
707

(978)
1
(15)
(994)

(1,147)
3
(9)
(1,159)

2,513
605
(32)
1,876

(7,376)
20
(25)
(7,421)

(8)

(11)

(8)

3

$

(986 )

$

(1,162 )

$

1,884

$

(7,410 )

$

(2.21 )

$

(0.68 )

$

0.59

$

(6.79 )

$

(2.21 )

$

(0.68 )

$

0.52

$

(6.79 )

445,783

1,700,213

441,301

1,092,241

445,783

1,700,213

477,592

1,092,241

Note: All figures in millions.
Source: Uber Technologies, Inc., 2019. Form 10-Q.
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Exhibit 6: Uber’s Consolidated Balance Sheet, Third Quarter 2019
As of December 31, 2018

Assets
Cash and cash equivalents
Restricted cash and cash equivalents
Accounts receivable, net of allowance of $34 and $40, respectively
Prepaid expenses and other current assets
Assets held for sale
Total current assets
Restricted cash and cash equivalents
Investments
Equity method investments
Property and equipment, net
Operating lease right-of-use assets
Intangible assets, net
Goodwill
Other assets
Total assets
Liabilities, mezzanine equity and equity (deficit)
Accounts payable
Short-term insurance reserves
Operating lease liabilities, current
Accrued and other current liabilities
Liabilities held for sale
Total current liabilities
Long-term insurance reserves
Long-term debt, net of current portion
Operating lease liabilities, non-current
Other long-term liabilities
Total liabilities
Commitments and contingencies (Note 15)
Mezzanine equity
Redeemable non-controlling interests
Redeemable convertible preferred stock, $0.00001 par value, 946,246 and
zero shares authorized, 903,607 and zero shares issued and outstanding,
respectively; aggregate liquidation preference of $14 and $0, respectively
Equity (deficit)
Common stock, $0.00001 par value, 2,696,114 and 5,000,000 shares
authorized, 457,189 and 1,703,630 shares issued and outstanding,
respectively
Additional paid-in capital
Accumulated other comprehensive loss
Accumulated deficit
Total Uber Technologies, Inc. stockholders' equity (deficit)
Non-redeemable non-controlling interests
Total equity (deficit)
Total liabilities, mezzanine equity and equity (deficit)

Note: All figures in millions.
Source: Uber Technologies, Inc., 2019. Form 10-Q.
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$

$
$

$

As of September 30, 2019

6,406
67
919
860
406
8,658
1,736
10,355
1,312
1,641
—
82
153
51
23,988

$

150
941
—
3,157
11
4,259
1,996
6,869
—
4,072
17,196

$

$

12,650
33
1,154
1,316
—
15,153
1,958
10,412
1,393
1,537
1,538
74
167
60
32,292
126
1,023
197
4,026
—
5,372
2,271
5,711
1,459
1,428
16,241

—

309

14,177

—

—
668
(188 )
(7,865 )
(7,385 )
—
(7,385 )
23,988

$

—
30,513
(185)
(15,266)
15,062
680
15,742
32,292

Exhibit 7: Uber’s Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows, Third Quarter 2019
Nine Months Ended September 30,
2018

Cash flows from operating activities
Net income (loss) including non-controlling interests
Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash used in operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization
Bad debt expense
Stock-based compensation
Gain on extinguishment of convertible notes and settlement of derivatives
Gain on business divestitures
Deferred income tax
Revaluation of derivative liabilities
Accretion of discount on long-term debt
Payment-in-kind interest
Loss on disposal of property and equipment
Impairment on long-lived assets held for sale
Loss from equity method investment
Gain on debt and equity securities, net
Non-cash deferred revenue
Gain on forfeiture of unvested warrants and related share repurchases
Unrealized foreign currency transactions
Other
Change in operating assets and liabilities, net of impact of business acquisitions and disposals:
Accounts receivable
Prepaid expenses and other assets
Operating lease right-of-use assets
Accounts payable
Accrued insurance reserve
Accrued expenses and other liabilities
Operating lease liabilities
Net cash used in operating activities
Cash flows from investing activities
Proceeds from insurance reimbursement, sale and disposal of property and equipment
Purchase of property and equipment
Purchase of equity method investments
Investments in debt securities
Proceeds from business disposal, net of cash divested
Acquisition of businesses, net of cash acquired
Net cash used in investing activities
Cash flows from financing activities
Proceeds from issuance of common stock upon initial public offering, net of offering costs
Taxes paid related to net share settlement of equity awards
Proceeds from issuance of common stock related to private placement

Note: All figures in millions.
Source: Uber Technologies, Inc., 2019. Form 10-Q.
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$

2019

1,876

$

(7,421 )

317
35
145
—
(3,208)
420
491
231
53
63
122
32
(1,984)
—
(152)
54
7

371
79
4,353
(444 )
—
(55 )
(58 )
80
10
14
—
25
(1 )
(39 )
—
(16 )
18

(359)
(421)
—
(66)
763
721
—
(860)

(342 )
(467 )
135
(23 )
356
997
(94 )
(2,522 )

329
(362)
(412)
(30)
—
(64)
(539)

41
(406 )
—
—
293
(7 )
(79 )

—
—
—

7,973
(1,514 )
500
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